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Are Brazilian corn farmers overconfident about prices? 
 
This paper aims to identify signs of overconfidence among corn producers in south and 
central-west Brazil. Over the period from October to November 2008, farmers were 
chosen to answer questions regarding their knowledge of futures markets and price 
expectations. A large part of subjects responded they do not trade futures contracts 
because they do not have enough information on the subject. The results show 
respondents were miscalibrated when estimating directly-stated and the indirectly-
stated expected prices. In addition, for certain respondents, subjective variance for corn 
proves to be significantly less than the market variance. Finally, the paper concludes 
that the overconfidence effect can partially explain the low use of futures markets by 
Brazilian corn producers. 
Key words: overconfidence, subjective probability, probability elicitation 
 
Introduction 
Commodity price is an important variable in determining whether an agricultural 
activity will be successful or not. Therefore, efficient risk management is crucial for the 
long-term economic survival of farms, and many instruments exist in the market for this 
purpose (EGELKRAUT, et al., 2006). 
Aguiar (1999) showed that there are at least three strategies which can be used 
by farmers to manage price risk. They include forward, futures and options contracts. 
Depending on the farmer’s goals, each of these alternatives bring more advantages than 2 
 
the others. Empirically, while these strategies are known as important management tools 
in agricultural markets, they are not widely known or used by Brazilian farmers 
(BORELLA, 2004). In a recent survey, Associação Nacional dos Confinadores (2008) - 
ASSOCON found that only 4% of the 486 feedlots in the state of Goiás, Brazil, hedge 
their production at the Brazilian Mercantile and Futures Exchange - BM&F
1. 
Academically, many studies have already proclaimed the benefits farmers can receive 
when using these tools, especially in futures markets (MARQUES, MELLO and 
MARTINES-FILHO (2008), ALVES, DUARTE and LIMA (2008), SILVEIRA and 
FERREIRA-FILHO (2003), ARBEX and CARVALHO (1998)). However, only a few 
of them give some explanation for the low use of these tools. Andrade (2004), for 
example, revealed that transaction costs in the context of the Brazilian futures markets 
can explain why many corn producers do not trade on BM&F to hedge their production. 
The same author showed that these costs are, on average, between 2 to 6.5% of the 
initial value of the contract. He concluded that traders facing cost risk diminish the risk 
management benefits offered by futures markets and have a similar effect of the basis 
risk. Furthermore, cost risk can reduce farmers’ willingness to hedge. Cruz-Junior, 
Marques and Martines-Filho (2008) demonstrated that in a downside risk framework 
sometimes the “true hedge ratio” can be smaller than the traditional one (obtained by the 
standard mean-variance model framework). In conclusion, more risk-averse cattle 
producers can hedge a smaller share of their current production simply because they 
face risk in an alternative way. 
                                                            
1 According to the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística - IBGE (2008), in 2007, the 
state of Goiás was the fourth most important cattle producer in Brazil. 3 
 
Some authors have already sought explanations for the low use of these hedging 
tools by Brazilian farmers.  However, no Brazilian economic literature has been found 
which gives either empirical or theoretical attention to the relationship between 
agricultural commodities prices quoted in organized futures markets and the subjective 
expectation of individuals. No attention has been given to producers’ subjective 
expectation or to their psychological influences in decision making. As discussed by 
Eales et al. (1990), this issue is of great importance to the validity of many studies that 
assume that futures price is a proxy for expected price.  In addition, this relationship is 
fundamental to most hedging decisions. For example, if a farmer is optimistic about 
futures/cash prices, there is no reason for he/she to assume a short position in futures 
markets. This optimism can be perceived in at least two different ways: futures prices 
are expected to be higher than the historical mean, and/or, the variance of futures prices 
are expected to be lower than the historical variance. This optimism is referred to in the 
literature as overconfidence and can play a major role in explaining why farmers hedge 
only a small part of their production or do not hedge at all. 
The motivation for this paper is to verify if Brazilian corn farmers exhibit any 
signs of overconfidence about prices, which in turn would provide an alternative 
explanation as to why they do not hedge in futures markets. To this end, a group of corn 
producers from south and central-west Brazil were chosen to complete a survey 
questionnaire. The survey was used to elicit famers’ subjective probabilities regarding 
expected cash prices. If at least a portion of farmers reveal overconfidence about 
expected cash prices when compared to futures prices, their behavior could be 
responsible in explaining farmers’ unwillingness to hedge their production with futures 
markets. 4 
 
Review of Literature 
Overconfident behavior has been cited by many researchers in explaining 
individual decision-making under uncertainty. Cunningham III et al. (2008), for 
example, found that men’s overconfidence makes them trade stocks more often than 
women and that consequently, they receive lower prices. Glaser and Weber (2007) 
found that overconfident investors will trade more than rational investors. Umarov and 
Sherrick (2005) indentified signs of overconfidence among farmers which could explain 
their crop insurance purchasing decisions. Eales et al. (1990) also found signs of 
overconfidence among farmers when their subjective probability distributions around 
futures and options prices were analyzed.  
Despite an increasing number of researchers who had summarized their findings 
as overconfidence, according to Glaser and Weber (2007), there is no precise definition 
to the overconfidence in the literature on heuristics and biases. Biais et al. (2003) 
defined overconfidence as a prevalent tendency of individuals to overestimate their 
skills, the probability of positive outcomes, or the accuracy of their knowledge.  
Graham, Harvey and Huang (2005) distinguished two different definitions of 
overconfidence. On the one hand, according to these authors, within the finance 
literature, overconfidence is usually defined as overestimating the precision of 
information regarding the value of a financial security. On the other hand, within the 
psychology literature, “overconfidence can mean either believing that the distribution of 
your knowledge is tighter than it actually is or, believing that your mean skill is higher 
than it actually is” (GRAHAM, HARVEY and HUANG, p. 7, 2005). 5 
 
More precisely, overconfidence can manifest itself in the following forms: 
miscalibration, better than average effect and illusion of control
2. 
Miscalibration 
Eales et al. (1990) briefly discussed some reasons as to why individual 
expectations may not agree with futures and options prices. One of their explanations is 
that individual probabilities assessments may be miscalibrated with the distribution of 
actual outcomes.  That is, farmers’ expectation may not accurately reflect the underlying 
distribution of prices. Therefore, it is expected that individuals would be overconfident 
and their subjective probabilities distributions consequently too narrow. 
Umarov and Sherrick (2005) explained that miscalibration can be assessed using 
two different methods. The first is called the confidence interval method. It consists of a 
list of questions to which the respondents answer and state their confidence in the 
correctness of their answers. Their confidence levels are then compared to the 
probability of answering correctly. For example, Biais et al. (2003) used this method to 
measure the degree of overconfidence of 245 participants in a trading game. They asked 
the respondents to write down low and high values to general questions such as the age 
of Martin Luther King Jr. at death, the air distance from London to Tokyo, etc.  
The second means of assessing the miscalibration effect is to ask respondents to 
provide a subjective probability distribution for an unknown quantity/yield/price. This 
subjective distribution is then compared to the true or historic distribution (objective 
                                                            
2 More forms of overconfidence can also be listed here, such as volatility estimates (Glaser and Weber, 
2007). However, some of these forms are considered as an alternative definition or part of the forms 
which were pointed out here. 6 
 
distribution). If the intervals provided are too tight, the conclusion is that historical 
volatilities are underestimated and the investor is overconfident. Pease (1992), for 
example, used this method to elicit subjective corn and soybean yield probabilities from 
90 Western Kentucky grain farmers. Previously, Eales et al. (1990) had used the same 
method to obtain estimates from different farmers groups and elevators in Illinois 
regarding their grain price expectations. The number of respondents within each group 
ranged from 14 to 59 people. 
De Bondt (1998) asked 45 investors to provide point forecasts of the closing 
level of the Dow Jones index and their main equity holdings. They were also asked to 
produce interval estimates (price levels) for which they believed there was only a one-
in-ten chance that the equity would turn out higher and lower. The author found that 
perceived confidence intervals were too narrow relative to the actual variability in 
prices. 
Smith and Mandac (1995) estimated and compared the subjective and objective 
probability distributions of rice yield for farmers in the Philippines. They solicited 
responses from 21 farmers in two different rice-growing areas and aimed to analyze 
whether their objective distributions could be taken as reasonable approximations of 
their perceptions. Farmers were surveyed before having any prediction of the weather 
conditions for the current crop season. First, the authors asked the farmers to specify 
their prediction for lowest and highest yield in the coming season. This range was then 
divided into five equal intervals. Twenty-five coins (amount of money equivalent to one 
day of work) were then given to the farmers and they were asked to distribute these 
coins among the intervals. Farmers were informed that at the end of the season, yields 
on the plots were going to be quantified and they would receive their previous 7 
 
allocation of coins, according to the interval which included their realized yield. They 
found that while the means were similar, the subjective variance was substantially lower 
than objective variances.  
Better-than-average effect 
Some researchers suggest that investors can be considered overconfident if they 
believe they are above average, (i.e. if they judge themselves as better than others with 
regard to skills or positive personality attributes) (Glaser and Weber, 2007). 
Benoît and Dubra (2008) mentioned some research in which the better-than-
average effect is described by showing that most people perceive themselves as more 
intelligent than their average peer, that most business managers rate their performance 
as better than their average fellow manager or that most high school students rate 
themselves as more original than the other high school students. 
Both Glaser and Weber (2007) and Benoît and Dubra (2008) highlighted the 
work developed by Svenson (1981) as one of the classical examples of the better-than-
average effect. In Svenson’s study, subjects were asked about their competence as 
drivers in relation to a group of drivers. He found that 77% of Swedish subjects felt they 
were safer drivers than the median, and 69% felt they were more skillful. He still found 
that 82% of a group of students ranked themselves among the top 30% safest drivers. 
Using survey data from 258 Illinois corn farmers, Egelkraut et al. (2006) 
investigated the relationship between subjective and objective yield measures and their 
effect on the use of crop insurance for corn. Among their motivation for research was 
included the claim that, even if insurance premiums were actuarially fair, there was little 
motivation for farmers to use insurance if their subjective yield distribution was more 
confident in high yields. Based on the answers to questions regarding farm-level yields 8 
 
and famers’ perceived relative performance compared to other farmers, the authors 
found that producers see themselves as better-than-average with respect to yield and 
their variability. 
The work developed by Hyytinen and Pajariten (2005) is another notable 
example of better-than-average effect in finance. The authors conducted their research 
with a sample of 393 four-month-old start-up firms in Finland. One of the questions 
they included in their survey asked entrepreneurs to estimate the probability that their 
venture would fail and that they would no longer be in business three years from that 
date. According to their findings, 87% of new entrepreneurs expected to survive at least 
three years in business, whereas the actual statistical survival rate was around 60% at 
the time. 
 
Illusion of control 
According to Graham, Harvey and Huang (2005), the illusion of control effect 
can be defined as the tendency to believe that one’s personal estimate of probability of 
success is higher than an objective probability would warrant. 
Keh, Foo and Lim (2002) defined the illusion of control effect as a bias in which 
the individual overemphasizes the extent to which his or her skills can increase 
performance in situations where chance plays a large role and skill is not necessarily the 
deciding factor. These same authors mentioned that entrepreneurs often show “an 
unusually strong preference for exerting control over their outcomes because they 
believe they can exert control over people and events” (KEH, FOO and LIM, p. 131, 
2002). Consequently, individuals who exhibit this form of overconfidence are more 9 
 
likely to underestimate risk because they believe their skills can prevent negative 
occurrences. 
After discussing some forms of overconfidence, Umarov and Sherrick (2005) 
asked the following question: How reasonable is to expect overconfidence among 
farmers? They answered that although some forms of overconfidence, such as the 
better-than-average effect and optimism can be found in various occupations, 
miscalibration is a different case because it varies among professions. According to 
Gervais, Heaton and Odean (2002), in the presence of high predictability, repetitive 
simple tasks, and clear and fast feedback, the individuals are well calibrated. Such is 
true in the case of bridge players, race bettors, and disabled people (Umarov and 
Sherrick, 2005). However, if the feedback is slow and noisy, individuals such as 
managers making a capital investment, for example, will not be well calibrated.  
When analyzing the three conditions listed by Gervais, Heaton and Odean 
(2002), Umarov and Sherrick (2005) concluded that there is empirical evidence that 
suggests the presence of overconfidence among farmers. The predictability of 
harvesting outcomes is low, and prices and yield are random variables. The feedback on 
an initial investment is distant in time and noisy. Furthermore, the decisions farmers 
make are somewhat complicated, and could obscure learning and lead to overconfidence 
bias in their judgments. According to Umarov and Sherrick (2005), farming as a 








During the months of October and November of 2008, a total of 90 corn 
producers in south and central-west Brazil were surveyed. Respondents from south 
Brazil consisted of prospective and new clients of a consulting company (Noble Group) 
and those from central-west Brazil were co-operators of a socioeconomic institute 
(Instituto Mato - Grossense de Economia Agrícola) or related to the Goiás State 
University. 
Their subjective corn price expectation was obtained in two formats. First, using 
a direct question, producers’ cash price expectations were obtained by simply asking 
farmers the most likely average price at which they expected to sell a 60 kg corn bag the 
following March. The second was an indirectly-stated price, based on the probability 
assignment task. Producers were asked to fill in boxes with the probabilities they 
believed that the corn price would stay within for each of the listed price ranges, during 
the following March/July. March and July were selected, first, because they are closest 
to the harvesting period in south and central-west
3 Brazil, respectively. Second, March 
and July contracts are the most liquid futures contracts traded at the BM&F.  
Participation in the survey was voluntary, unassisted and no financial incentive 
was given to respondents. 
The same survey method was used to obtain probability estimates by Clop-
Gallart and F. Juárez-Rubio (2007), Egelkraut et al. (2006) and Eales et al. (1990). 
 
                                                            
3 Only for the state of Mato Grosso. In the state of Goiás, the first crop season is the most important. 11 
 
The subjective probability distribution and the method for comparing subjective spot 
prices and futures prices volatilities 
A subjective probability can be interpreted “as a decison maker’s degree of 
beliefs or expectations about the outcome of a nonrepetitive, uncertain event” 
(GRISLEY and KELLOG, p. 74, 1983). It can be thought of as a translation of 
someone’s beliefs after using the information available and processing abilities. 
Moreover, its true value is found be between zero and one. Considering this final point, 
while responding the survey subjects were asked to state “scores” from 0 to 100% to 
reflect their perceived likelihood of each price range listed in the questionnaire. Pease 
(1992) defined a “coherence of probability” requirement as the condition of the 
summation of each price range probability being equal to one (or 100%).  
As the aim of this paper is to test for overconfidence based on the miscalibration 
effect, one must first verify whether the respondents were well calibrated in their 
answers when estimating directly-stated and indirectly-stated expected prices. To do so, 













D P the directly-stated price, 
I P and 
I P s are respectively the indirectly-
stated price and the standard deviation calculated from the elicited subjective 
distribution, and  is the significance level. On one hand, the null hypothesis states that 
there is no difference between the two elicited prices. On the other hand, the alternative 
hypothesis states that the respondent can be miscalibrated when directly estimating 
either a higher or lower price compared to the expected subjective mean of the 
subjective distribution. Buzby et al. (1994), for example, also analyzed discrepancies 12 
 
between subjective and historical yield distributions for Kentucky farmers. According to 
their findings, there is a correspondence between the means of the two distributions, but 
farmers overestimate their yields and underestimate their risk. 
Second, the study must verify whether individuals are miscalibrated when 
(over)underestimating the variance of spot prices when compared to the historical 
variance of futures and spot prices. If the subjective variance is smaller than the 
empirical one (i.e. the perceived distribution of spot prices is tighter than the historical 
distribution of futures and spot prices) it can be concluded farmers do not expect prices 
will vary as much they used to
4. 
Under the assumption that the natural logarithm of prices  t P  is normally 
distributed with mean  and variance
2  , these parameters were calculated as (Limpert, 
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The variances obtained from survey respondents are monthly based. In order to 
perform the proposed comparison, means and variances obtained from historical data 
for futures and spot prices were also calculated as monthly parameters. 
According to Berenson and Levine (1999), since it is assumed the variable is 
normally distributed, the 
2  test statistic can be used to represent the distribution of the 
                                                            
4 Eales et al. (1990) proposed the same type of comparison. However, these authors obtained estimates 
from respondents regarding their spot price and basis expectations (basis = cash – futures prices). By 
adding up the expected values of the two variables, they created a subject futures price variable. They also 
assumed spot price and basis distributions were independent. 13 
 
variability in the sample data and for testing whether or not the calculated variance (or 
standard deviation) is equal to a specified value. The test statistic can be calculated as 
the following: 










For a given sample size n (number of filled intervals), the test statistic 
2 
follows a chi-squared distribution with (n-1) degrees of freedom. 
2 S and
2  are the 
sample (subject) and the hypothesized population variance (historical), respectively. 
The 
2  test for variance can be either a two-tailed or a one-tailed test, depending 
on whether the alternative hypothesis is nondirectional or directional. As far as the 
individuals can be either overconfident or underconfident, Eales et al. (1990) proposed a 
two tailed 
2  test to verify differences between the survey and market variances for 
soybeans and corn prices. 















The decision rule is developed as:  












, otherwise do not reject  0 H . 
The first condition implies the individual’s variance is higher than the market’s, 
from which the conclusion follows that he/she is underconfident. The second condition 
implies that the variance of the survey respondent is significantly less than the market’s 




In addition to the information from the 90 survey questionnaires, futures and 
spot prices were obtained at BM&F and at Centro de Estudos Avançados em Economia 
Aplicada – CEPEA
5, respectively, from January 2004 to October 2008. The nearby 
contract was used for futures prices. The period was chosen because of spot data 
availability. 
Results 
Among the 90 survey respondents
6, 52 were from southern Brazil (58%). Most 
were from the state of Rio Grande do Sul (34), followed by Paraná (12) and Santa 
Catarina (7).  In central-west Brazil, most respondents were from Mato Grosso (29), 
followed by Goiás (8). According to Companhia Nacional de Abastecimento – CONAB 
(2008), these states are among the top 6 producers in Brazil. 
Respondents were also asked to answer additional questions related to their 
knowledge of futures markets and related issues. A total of 10 respondents answered 
that they knew about and trade futures contracts at BM&F. Most of the respondents (72) 
only knew about BM&F but do not trade on it, while the rest (8) did not know about 
futures markets. The producers who indicated they knew about, but do not trade futures 
contracts at BM&F were asked to state their reasons for not trading. 75,5% of these 
producers responded they do not have enough information about trading futures at 
BM&F, 9 respondents see futures markets as risky (12%), 4 answered they do not trade 
                                                            
5 Prices obtained from CEPEA were used as the mean state price for each one of the 5 different states 
where surveys were applied. 
6 An example of the survey questionnaire is available upon request. 15 
 
because it is expensive (5,5%), and only 7% who answered the question claimed they 
do not trade due to margin calls, because they need advice, or because beginning to 
trade entails too much bureaucracy. 
Subjects were also asked to reveal if they had already sold a part of their next 
crop. Only 8 producers (9%) said they had already sold a part of it and none of them had 
sold their entire crop. 
When asked about having investments other than those in agricultural markets, 
12% (11 respondents) listed alternative investments. Among them, 4 (33.3%) had 
investments in real estate while others were involved in other activities. 
In order to perform the proposed overconfidence analysis, only respondents who 
were coherent
7 while listing their estimated probabilities were selected (86 
respondents). Three respondents who did not answer this question were eliminated from 
the analysis, as well as two others who concentrated all their expectations in only one 
price range. Therefore, 81 respondents were selected for the analysis. 
As it was assumed futures and spot prices follow lognormal distributions, the 
Jarque-Bera test (JB) was also conducted to verify that the natural logarithm of prices is 
normally distributed. According to table 1, the null hypothesis could not be rejected for 
the computed values for the JB test, at the 5% level of significance for any of the 
analyzed series, thus leading to the conclusion that the assumption previously made 




7 Coherence is defined here in the Pease (1992) sense: elicited subjective probabilities must add up to 1 
(100%) 16 
 
Table 1. Jarque Bera Test for Normality 




Paraná Goiás Mato 
Grosso 
JB 1.362  1.368  1.345  1.739  3.044 1.362 
P-Value (0.506)  (0.504)  (0.510)  (0.419)  (0.218)  (0.506) 
 
To test if respondents were miscalibrated when pointing out the directly-stated 
and the indirectly-stated expected prices, the t-Student test was performed. Prices in 
equation (1) were calculated as the mean prices of their respective lognormal 
distributions in equation (2) as well as the standard deviation in equation (3). According 
to the results, at the 5% level of significance, the null hypothesis of equality between the 
directly and the indirectly-stated prices could not be rejected for only 7 respondents 
(8.64%). 74 (91.35%) producers reveled themselves as miscalibrated when calculating 
their expected values. All individuals from south Brazil proved themselves as 
miscalibrated. 
Following Eales (1990), individual subjective variances and historical variance 
were compared. Calculated chi-squared statistics values were compared to their 
respective two-sided test statistic (5% level of significance) to evaluate whether 
individuals were underconfident or overconfident about prices.  
Each farmer’s subjective variance was compared to the historical variance of his 
or her respective regional price. 44.44% of farmers revealed themselves as 
miscalibrated as their subjective variances underestimated the historical variances 
obtained from regional prices. 28 (44.12%) of them are from southern Brazil and 8 from 
central-west (28.57%).  17 
 
When farmer’s subjective variances were compared to the historical variance of 
futures prices, 62 (76.54%) subjects could be considered miscalibrated. 71.69% of 
central-western farmers and 85.71% of southern farmers expected their subjective 
variance to be smaller than the historical variance of futures prices. 
With the exception of one farmer, all the others who answered he/she knew 
about and traded futures contracts at BM&F showed themselves as overconfident about 
the variance of futures prices. Most of the farmers (66%) who answered they knew 
about but did not trade futures contracts at BM&F because they did not have enough 
information were also identified as miscalibrated. 
Furthermore, two among the eight (25%) farmers who had already sold a part of 
his/her next crop could be considered as miscalibrated as well as two among those  
eleven (18%) who said they had an alternative investment than those in agricultural 
markets. 
The results found are in accordance with Eales et al. (1990) and support the 
hypothesis that corn producers believe spot prices vary less than futures prices. In 
addition, as some of their subjective variances are smaller than the historical ones, the 
results indicate signs of overconfidence among famers. 
 
Conclusions 
As a primary work of its kind in the Brazilian literature, this research attempted to 
discuss and investigate reasons as to why such few corn farmers hedge on futures 
markets. Moreover, the most important explanation highlighted by this work concerns 
farmers’ perception of variance of spot and futures prices. 18 
 
The survey applied in south and central-west Brazil showed that only 10% of 
respondents traded futures at the Brazilian Futures and Mercantile Exchange. Most 
farmers revealed that they were aware of but did not trade futures contracts. The most 
important reason for not trading, discovered through the surveys, was that farmers did 
not have enough information to trade on futures markets. 
As argued by many authors, an important factor in determining the type and extent 
of hedging with options, futures and other risk management tools may be the difference 
in subjective variances. If farmers perceive variances of spot and futures prices to be 
lower than they actually are, there may be less incentive for them to hedge on futures 
markets.  
When analyzing differences among subjective and historical spot and futures price 
variances, evidence was found of disagreement between respondents and the market. 
Where found, respondents expected lower variances than the market, which points to 
signs of overconfidence among corn famers. Differences between directly-stated and 
indirectly-stated spot prices were also found for most of the farmers, which shows 
farmers were miscalibrated when evaluating expected prices. 
While this research can be considered as novel in the Brazilian literature on futures 
markets, it is only an initial step of further investigation into the topic. Only when future 
research investigates multi-period surveys and extends the surveys to a larger number of 
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